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Dynamic Common Law and 
Technological Change: The 
Classification of Bitcoin 
Shawn Bayern* 
Abstract 
Most legal analysis of Bitcoin has addressed public-law and 
regulatory matters, such as taxation, securities regulation, and 
money laundering. This essay considers some questions that 
Bitcoin raises from a private-law perspective, and it aims to show 
that technological innovation may highlight problems with 
conceptualistic, classical rules of private law. 
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THE CLASSIFICATION OF BITCOIN 23 
I. Introduction 
It is tempting, in considering how the law should regulate 
Bitcoin, to start by trying to categorize it: Is it a commodity? A 
collectible? A currency? A security?1 While categorization of a new 
technology can be useful in fashioning responses to it, the 
enterprise is at heart conceptualistic rather than functional: the 
question invites scrutiny of definitions rather than policies and of 
the relationship between legal rules rather than the results of 
applying them. Interestingly, too, most of the existing attempts to 
categorize Bitcoin implicate its regulatory treatment; they are 
essentially public-law proposals. So, for example, there has been 
a lot of attention—for good reason—on questions of how to tax 
Bitcoins, of how they interact with payment-processing 
regulations, and so forth.2 There has been relatively little 
attention on the core private-law questions that Bitcoin raises. 
This essay begins to address some private-law questions 
concerning Bitcoin. For example, what rights does holding a 
Bitcoin confer, and against whom? Are the rights contractual, and 
to what extent is a bitcoin a chose in action?3 What is the best 
way to enforce the rights associated with Bitcoin? In starting to 
address these questions, I suggest a broader, more theoretical 
thesis, which is that existing, historical private-law categories 
need not be functionally useful. Positive law is just positive law, 
                                                                                                     
 * Larry & Joyce Beltz Professor, Florida State University College of Law. 
B.S., Yale University, Computer Science; J.D., University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law. Thanks to Rob Atkinson and Don Weidner for helpful 
discussions. 
 1. For the first thorough attempts to classify Bitcoin under existing 
United States regulations, see Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative 
Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 181–206 (2012). 
 2. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 41–48 (2013) (discussing Bitcoin’s potential effects 
on the enforcement of tax regulations); Grinberg, supra note 1, at 181–206 
(providing an overview of the financial regulations that may govern Bitcoin); see 
generally Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the 
Future?, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 272 (2013) (providing general 
regulatory discussions). 
 3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that a “chose in 
action” is a right to sue for possession or recovery of personal property, damages, 
or a debt).  
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and one nice thing about new technologies like Bitcoin is that 
they can help us see limitations in our classical categories. 
II. Holding Bitcoins: An Ambiguous Concept 
To begin with, it is important to disaggregate the concept of 
“holding bitcoins” in the first place. To do this, it will be necessary 
to review briefly how Bitcoin works technologically.4  
Bitcoin is simply software that is run on a decentralized 
collection of computer systems. Anyone can download and run it. 
This software, in coordination with other copies of itself running 
around the world, generates and records units of account known 
as “bitcoins,” much in the way that a distributed computer game 
might record points for its players.5 Bitcoins, however, have come 
to have financial value; people buy and sell them on financial 
exchanges scattered throughout the world, making and losing 
significant amounts of money. Bitcoins have value at least in part 
because the software (if it works properly, as it has for the most 
part done so far) ensures (1) their scarcity (people cannot 
arbitrarily create Bitcoins; they arise only through the 
expenditure of real computing power, as judged reliably by the 
Bitcoin software); (2) their security (transmitting bitcoins 
requires knowledge of their “secret key,” a number that it is 
statistically impossible to guess); and (3) the ability to transmit 
them with relative ease.6 
This brief description is technologically accurate and matches 
the ways that people commonly discuss Bitcoin; that is, it is 
common to speak of “buying a bitcoin” or “holding a bitcoin” (as 
an investment). But the description is legally imprecise in an 
                                                                                                     
 4. I have provided a slightly more technical overview for legal audiences 
in Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-
Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257 (2014), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/online/2014/6/Bayern.pdf. For the 
initial technological overview of Bitcoin written by its creator, see SATOSHI 
NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008), 
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 5. I follow here the increasingly popular convention of referring to the 
technology as Bitcoin and to the assets the technology creates as bitcoins. 
 6. See Bayern, supra note 4, at 259–64 (providing a more extensive 
introduction to several technical features of Bitcoin that may be relevant to 
lawyers).  
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important way that has received little academic attention. In 
particular, what does it mean to “hold a bitcoin”? 
The answer depends on precisely how the bitcoin is held. 
Hard statistics are likely unavailable, but many and perhaps 
most people who “hold” (or “own” or “buy”) bitcoins have done so 
without running a copy of Bitcoin software that directly 
participates in the Bitcoin network and without setting up the 
cryptographic framework that would be necessary to safeguard 
the private numbers—“keys”—that confer the ability to transfer 
bitcoins on the Bitcoin network. Instead, many people who have 
purchased bitcoins simply keep an account on a website that 
operates as a kind of informal bank or broker. The website 
reports a financial balance to the investor, and the investor at 
that point may think “I own 100 bitcoins.” In thinking that, the 
investor presumably means that he or she has taken a financial 
position corresponding to the ownership of bitcoins—that is, that 
he or she is making a particular (short-term or long-term) bet. 
III. Bitcoins as a Contract Right 
As far as the Bitcoin software is concerned, however, the 
investor does not have control over any bitcoins. For example, 
there is nothing the investor can do, technologically, to compel 
the website to return the bitcoins. Similarly, as a matter of law, 
the investor probably does not “own” any bitcoins, at least not in 
the sense of having title to personal property corresponding 
directly to bitcoins. What the investor has is simply a contract 
right against the operator of the website—what was classically, 
at common law, called a chose (i.e., thing) in action.7 This sort of 
right is meaningfully different from having possession of personal 
property. For one thing, it is subject to a risk of default—if, for 
example, the website becomes insolvent, as has happened many 
times in Bitcoin’s short history. For another, a contract right is 
not identical, economically or legally, to possession; a claim must 
                                                                                                     
 7. See W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action 
by the Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1920) (“In its primary sense the 
term ‘chose in action’ includes all rights which are enforceable by action—rights 
to debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a contract or a right to damages for 
its breach . . . .”). 
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be fought, won, and enforced—and legal rules concerning 
enforcement may well limit the economic value of the right if, for 
example, they restrict the award of specific performance in favor 
of an objective measurement of expectation damages. 
In this sense, keeping a bitcoin on deposit with a Bitcoin 
exchange or other online service is somewhat similar to keeping 
dollars on deposit at a bank.8 But there are several important 
differences. One, of course, is simply regulatory: banks are highly 
regulated and are insured; Bitcoin exchanges are neither. 
Another difference is technical and theoretical: perhaps “deposit” 
is a notion that is or ought to be restricted to regulated banks.9 
But the most important difference between holding dollars at a 
bank and holding bitcoins at a Bitcoin exchange is that the 
contract right at issue in both cases need not be enforced in the 
same way. A deposit of dollars at a bank does not raise, in most 
cases, significant questions concerning the appropriate contract 
remedy.10 This is mainly because expectation damages are 
denominated in dollars and are, as a result, a convenient remedy 
for breach of an agreement to keep dollars on deposit; a bank’s 
failure to pay back a $200 deposit easily leads to a judgment of 
$200. Specific performance is typically unavailable to support 
recovery of a bank deposit because it is generally unavailable 
when the breached duty was simply to pay a fixed sum of 
money.11 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Rhys Bollen, What is a Deposit (and Why Does It Matter)?, 13 
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 202, 206 (2006) (“The right to repayment the 
customer holds in relation to money deposited is a chose in action.”). 
 9. See id. at 207 (“Some writers have questioned whether non-traditional 
banking products and other payment facilities are deposits. For example, do 
stored value cards and stores of digital cash, particularly if held by an ADI 
[Authorised Deposit-taking Institution] on behalf of a customer, constitute a 
deposit?”). 
 10. Generally, a depositor’s claim against a bank is simply a contractual 
right. See, e.g., Dektor v. Overbrook Nat’l Bank, 10 F. Supp. 894, 896 (E.D. Pa. 
1934) (“The money deposited becomes the property of the bank, and the plaintiff 
acquires a contract right. The relation created is that of debtor and creditor. 
There is no express contract, but the terms are all implied. They arise from and 
are defined by the established usages of banking practice.”); 10 AM. JUR. 2D 
Banks and Financial Institutions § 640 (1963) (“The term ‘deposit,’ when used in 
connection with a banking transaction, denotes a contractual 
relationship . . . .”).  
 11. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 63.7 (Joseph M. Perillo 
ed.) (1979) 
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It would be a mistake to generalize from bank deposits to 
bitcoin deposits, however, and to assume that expectation 
damages are sufficient in the case of a failure to repay a debt of 
bitcoins. Indeed, specific performance would probably be a more 
appropriate default remedy for contracts to pay bitcoins. 
For one thing, doctrinally speaking, the unavailability of 
specific performance in cases where the breached duty was 
simply to transfer a fixed sum of dollars probably tells us little 
about the appropriateness of specific performance in general. In 
such cases, the difference between specific performance and 
damages is exceedingly minimal, at least if the enforcement 
mechanism for damages is sufficiently effective against a 
judgment debtor who has the capacity to satisfy the judgment. 
There has been some recent discussion emphasizing the 
theoretical differences between expectation damages and specific 
performance in cases like these, but I believe these differences 
amount to very little in practice. For example, Nathan Oman has 
recently advanced the counterintuitive thesis that defendants 
have no legal duty to pay judgments, a proposition he supports by 
observing that a judgment for damages “does not give rise to any 
additional liability or other sanction.”12 I believe this claim is 
untrue, however. Professor Oman discusses a Vermont statute 
that contradicts this position, but he argues that “no other state 
seems to have followed Vermont in making an injunctive remedy 
available to collect ordinary debts.”13 This, however, is incorrect; 
Vermont’s statute is not in fact atypical.14 The better view is 
                                                                                                     
At one extreme, is the case of money debts or other unilateral 
contracts for the mere payment of money, [where] there is generally 
no difficulty in determining the amount of damages. The action of 
debt at common law in these cases was as truly an action for specific 
performance as is a decree in equity, even though the mode of 
enforcing the judgment was different from the mode of enforcing the 
decree. The judgment is regarded as an adequate remedy. A suit for 
specific performance, in so far as that involves any difference from 
the money judgment, is not maintainable. 
See also id. § 63.15 (“It is seldom that money damages would not be an adequate 
remedy for breach of a contract to lend money. Specific performance has 
therefore been refused in most cases of this sort.”).  
 12. Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty To Pay Damages: Powers, 
Duties, and Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 152 (2011).  
 13. Id. at 154–55. 
 14. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5537 (2012) (“Failure to make such 
28 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2014) 
simply that when a judgment for damages is insufficient to 
enforce a duty to pay money, courts relatively easily grant 
specific performance—either instead of such a judgment (if its 
inadequacy is apparent beforehand) or afterwards (via a 
mechanism commonly known as a “turnover order”).15 There is 
not a rigid conceptual line between the two remedies; the 
difference in their availability is largely the result of practical 
considerations.16  
Normatively speaking, specific performance is an excellent 
mechanism to enforce a legal duty to transfer bitcoins. Consider 
the factors in favor of modern decrees of specific performance that 
Corbin’s treatise lists: 
Among the factors to be considered in granting a decree for 
specific performance, the most important seem to be the 
following: difficulty and uncertainty in determining the 
amount of damages to be awarded for the defendant's breach, 
difficulty and uncertainty in the collection of damages after 
                                                                                                     
payments [as the court deems appropriate] may be considered civil contempt of 
court.”), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 699.040 (West 2012) (allowing a judgment 
creditor to apply to the court, upon a “showing of need,” for a court order 
directing that the judgment debtor transfer property to the judgment creditor to 
satisfy a claim). New York and California have comparable statutes:  
Upon motion of the judgment creditor, upon notice to the judgment 
debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is in possession or 
custody of money or other personal property in which he has an 
interest, the court shall order that the judgment debtor pay the 
money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the 
judgment creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to 
satisfy the judgment, to deliver any other personal property, or so 
much of it as is of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment, to a 
designated sheriff. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225 (MCKINNEY 2012). 
 15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “turnover 
order” as “[a]n order by which the court commands a judgment debtor to 
surrender certain property to a judgment creditor”). Such an order is usually 
“directed to property that is difficult to acquire by the ordinary judgment-
collection process, such as share certificates and accounts receivable.” Id. 
 16. Cf. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 63.7  
Even the fact that the defendant’s assets will not be subject to 
execution because of statutory exemption or because of location in 
another state may prevent damages from being an adequate remedy 
and, therefore, make it desirable to prevent the injury rather than to 
leave the injured party to an uncollectible judgment for compensation 
after the injury occurs. 
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they are awarded, the insufficiency of money damages to 
obtain the duplicate or the substantial equivalent of the 
promised performance, either because the subject matter of 
the contract is unique or rare and cannot easily be duplicated 
or because the obtaining of a substantial equivalent involves 
difficulty, delay, and inconvenience.17 
A debt denominated in bitcoins satisfies nearly all of these 
criteria. Because of the rapidly changing market value of bitcoins 
(denominated in dollars and other traditional currencies),18 
calculating damages risks significant error. Because purchasing 
bitcoins with dollars may involve significant transfer costs, risks 
of theft, and so on, an award of dollars is insufficient to address 
the expectations of a plaintiff, who may have intended to hold 
bitcoins rather than dollars.19  
In short, emphasizing the similarity between bitcoins and 
dollars—or generalizing from a definition of bitcoin as “money” 
where the definition suits an unrelated context—would be the 
wrong way to determine a functional remedy in the case of 
contracts to transfer bitcoins, including contracts involving the 
deposit of bitcoins. A functional analysis based on the interests 
and expectations of the parties leads fairly easily to an award of 
specific performance in such cases. 
IV. Direct Ownership of Bitcoins: A New Class of Private Property 
The upshot of Part III is that holding a bitcoin using a 
financial intermediary is conceptually similar to owning 
traditional currency using a financial intermediary, except that 
the conceptual similarity should not cloud important distinctions 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, In the Murky World of Bitcoin, Fraud Is 
Quicker Than the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013, 6:58 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/in-the-murky-world-of-bitcoin-fraud-is-
quicker-than-the-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014) 
(noting tremendous fluctuations in the price of bitcoins) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. For a broader discussion of the purposes of remedies in contract law, 
see Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and Its 
Discontents, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (arguing in favor of a subjective 
“indifference principle” under which remedies are judged by their ability to 
make the promisee indifferent between performance and breach). 
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that should drive normative differences in enforcement—namely, 
the availability of specific performance in claims for breach of 
contract involving bitcoins. 
Direct ownership of bitcoins raises different legal problems. 
A central technological innovation of the Bitcoin software is that 
owning a bitcoin directly—and I will discuss in a moment 
precisely what such ownership entails—amounts itself to 
possessing something of value, rather than merely having a claim 
against someone else for a preexisting, underlying asset.20 That 
is, as investors over the past several years have recognized, 
cryptocurrencies are a new class of asset; they are not simply 
proxies for or claims upon existing assets. Consequently, while 
deposits over the years have been either bailments or contractual 
debts,21 in a meaningful sense the ownership of a bitcoin is 
neither. 
Of course, there are many familiar types of intangible 
personal property that cannot easily be reduced to debts or 
bailments, such as a share of stock22 or a partnership interest.23 
In a sense, owning a bitcoin resembles such ownership interests, 
except that the distributed network of computer systems running 
Bitcoin is not a legal entity or even a legal aggregation of any 
kind; a bitcoin is, in at least a poetic sense, a share in an 
informally organized social process. 
This Part considers more precisely the legal nature of bitcoin 
ownership, but it does so only to make a larger jurisprudential 
point, which is that considering the legal “nature” of ownership is 
only a very preliminary first step in using the private law to 
regulate a new technology. Categorizing Bitcoin is little more 
                                                                                                     
 20. For a pre-Bitcoin analysis of electronic payment systems, analogizing 
them to 19th-century banknotes and suggesting that a classical legal regime 
should govern them, see James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic 
Money, 58 SMU L. REV. 1253 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Bollen, supra note 8, at 203 (“The goldsmith had evolved to a 
banker of sorts—the receipt evolved from a record of bailment to record of 
debt.”). 
 22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (2014) (“The shares of stock in 
every corporation shall be deemed personal property . . . .”). 
 23. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 502 (1997) (“The only transferable interest of a 
partner in the partnership is the partner’s share of the profits and losses of the 
partnership and the partner’s right to receive distributions. The interest is 
personal property.”). 
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than a pedagogical methodology to aid in its understanding; it 
cannot determine sound legal policy.24 
This Part considers these matters in turn; Part IV.A sheds 
more light on bitcoin ownership, and Part IV.B argues that the 
“legal nature” of bitcoin ownership is probably not very important 
in developing common-law rules that address Bitcoin. 
A. Bitcoins and Private-Law Rights 
As noted earlier, owning a bitcoin has something in common 
with owning a stock or a partnership interest; both are intangible 
personal property that can be valuable on their own without 
direct implication of further legal relationships. So, for example, 
shares in corporate stock may have value even though there is no 
present claim to dividends or even an immediately recognizable 
prospect of a dividend payment. But stock in a company and 
other similar forms of intangible personal property are different 
from bitcoin in an important way, which is that ownership of 
corporate stock confers transactional rights (such as, for example, 
a right to vote for corporate directors or to receive a declared 
dividend), whereas on closer inspection ownership of a bitcoin 
does not itself confer a legal right against participants in the 
Bitcoin system. Note that owning a bitcoin does confer rights 
generally—for example, as with most property, the right against 
interference with “possession” from the world at large.25 But a 
bitcoin does not represent a transactional or organizational right 
in the way that shares of stock or a partnership interest do. 
To understand why this is so, it may be helpful to elaborate 
what a bitcoin is in the first place. As discussed previously, a 
bitcoin corresponds to no external asset, and it is not in fact 
something that physically exists. A bitcoin is nothing more than a 
convention established by a distributed algorithm, coordinated 
                                                                                                     
 24. Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical 
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1059 (“The logic 
of rights is a human invention whose purpose is to preserve us from the notion 
that we must make political and moral choices. To make conscious choices, it is 
necessary to realize that we are making a choice.”). 
 25. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (2014) (including “intangible 
personal property” in the definition of property protected by the laws concerning 
theft and related offenses). 
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securely and reliably by many copies of the same software 
running throughout the world. There is an important sense in 
which individual bitcoins do not even exist at all; if I own, for 
example, 2.55 bitcoins, I do not have 2.55 times more of 
something physical than if I owned a single bitcoin. What I have 
specifically is knowledge of a long secret number that confers the 
ability to transfer a logical amount of value (2.55 bitcoins) to any 
arbitrary Bitcoin address of my choosing. On technical and 
physical grounds, I have exactly the same thing if I own any 
number of other bitcoins; the economic difference is simply that 
the distributed system running the Bitcoin software 
acknowledges my ability to send one amount rather than another. 
These amounts have come to have financial value outside the 
Bitcoin system itself, but that value is not something the Bitcoin 
software particularly cares about; the Bitcoin software does not 
know the exchange rate between a bitcoin and a dollar. It simply 
processes transfers of arbitrary amounts.26 
In Hohfeldian terms,27 given merely my knowledge of a secret 
key for a certain amount of bitcoins, there is nobody associated 
with Bitcoin against whom I have a claim-right, and conversely 
nobody has a duty to me—apart from the general duty to refrain 
from interfering with intangible personal property. Those 
running the Bitcoin software are free to ignore my attempts to 
transfer bitcoins to a new bitcoin address. They have no contract 
with me, implied or otherwise. They are free to ignore me, to 
dispute my ownership of bitcoins on technological grounds, and so 
on. The Bitcoin system works only because there are 
mathematically verifiable ways to convince other honest users of 
the software that my own bitcoins represent a legitimate stake 
(and because there is a social trust that enough honest people will 
continue to run the Bitcoin software). But, for example, if all the 
current participants in Bitcoin chose not to run the Bitcoin 
                                                                                                     
 26. One minor qualification to the notion that Bitcoin processes all 
amounts identically is that the leading modern Bitcoin client has introduced 
rules that prevent the sending of very small amounts under certain conditions 
without the payment, in bitcoins, of a transaction fee. See Bitcoin Transaction 
Fees Explained, BITCOIN FEES, http://bitcoinfees.com (last updated Feb. 12, 2014) 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–37 (1913). 
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software, or if individual participants ran modifications of the 
software that operated on rules different from those that I 
initially understood, it is unlikely I have any recourse. In this 
sense, a bitcoin is not a right against the other users (qua users) 
of the Bitcoin network.28 
What is bitcoin ownership, then? It is not a contract or a 
bailment. Indeed, it is probably not a chose in action of any kind 
because it represents no claim against others. (It perhaps 
resembles a Hohfeldian power—that is, an ability to change 
others’ legally protected rights.)29 In a meaningful sense, it is 
something new. 
B. Theory and Function in Common Law Responses to 
Technological Change 
Because Bitcoin is something new, it does not fit neatly into 
classical categories. It is striking to observe, even within the last 
hundred years, how several fundamental rules of private 
property, and the common law more generally, have moved away 
from their older conceptualism. For example, even the 1900s saw 
significant change with regard to the legal treatment of the 
conversion30 and assignability31 of choses in action. 
                                                                                                     
 28. It is interesting to consider under what circumstances group 
participation in modification to the Bitcoin software to violate the expectations 
of Bitcoin users would amount to conversion, fraud, or any other actionable 
harm. That discussion is outside the scope of this essay, but I am skeptical that 
any such behavior is in fact wrongful—any more than setting up copies of the 
Bitcoin software that behave differently (a practice on which other 
cryptocurrencies like Litecoin depend)—is wrongful. While interference with 
individually owned bitcoins via a technological vulnerability on the owner’s 
computer system probably amounts to conversion, influencing the evolution of 
the Bitcoin software is likely a risk that bitcoin owners reasonably intend to 
take. In some sense, owning a bitcoin is a tradeoff compared to owning other 
assets: in owning a dollar, an individual takes some risk that the dollar will be 
devalued by virtue of the central-banking functions of the Federal Reserve; in 
owning a bitcoin, he or she takes some risk that the bitcoin will be devalued by 
operation of the decentralized “banking” functions associated with the Bitcoin 
software itself.  
 29. Hohfeld, supra note 27, at 44–48. 
 30. See, e.g., Lester Rubin, Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 415–19 (1941) (documenting changes in the law governing 
the conversion of choses in action). 
 31. See generally LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC 
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The trend toward functional rather than formal analysis in 
the common law demonstrates the importance of not relying 
excessively on categorization when determining legal rules that 
will govern bitcoin ownership, bitcoin transactions, and so on. In 
functional terms, a bitcoin is an important economic right to 
many who participate in the network. It is clearly proper to 
criminalize its theft. It matches parties’ expectations if bitcoin is 
treated as intangible, moveable personal property. Contracts 
involving bitcoins should be enforced. 
In modern private law, the remaining difficulties arise 
largely because of conceptualism and categorization that statutes 
create or preserve. So, for example, is a bitcoin a “good” under 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code? Article 2 defines 
goods as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for 
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, 
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.”32 Under 
this definition, much will depend on non-functional decisions 
about whether bitcoins are “moveable,” whether I am correct that 
a bitcoin is not a thing (i.e., chose) in action, whether it is 
“money,” and so on. This is unfortunate because little should turn 
on such arbitrary matters, and clearly the UCC did not 
contemplate them. In common law alone, there would be little 
reason to ask these questions. 
                                                                                                     
CONTRACT LAW 1087–91 (8th ed. 2006). 
 32. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2013). 
